# Multi-unit Assignment under Dichotomous Preferences

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/1703.10897 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/1703.10897/

## Key facts

- Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 31 Mar 2017.

## Built on by (most cited first, 2 of 2)

- [Yankee Swap: a Fast and Simple Fair Allocation Mechanism for Matroid Rank Valuations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2206.08495/) (2022)
- [The Dichotomous Affiliate Stable Matching Problem: Approval-Based Matching with Applicant-Employer Relations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2202.11095/) (2022)

## Abstract (arXiv)

I study the problem of allocating objects among agents without using money. Agents can receive several objects and have dichotomous preferences, meaning that they either consider objects to be acceptable or not. In this setup, the egalitarian solution is more appealing than the competitive equilibrium with equal incomes because it is Lorenz dominant, unique in utilities, and group strategy-proof. Moreover, it can be adapted to satisfy a new fairness axiom that arises naturally in this context. Both solutions are disjoint.