# Sponsored Search Auctions with Rich Ads

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/1701.05948 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/1701.05948/

## Key facts

- Cited by 3 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 20 Jan 2017.

## Built on by (most cited first, 3 of 3)

- [On the Factory Floor: ML Engineering for Industrial-Scale Ads Recommendation Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2209.05310/) (2022)
- [Auctions with LLM Summaries](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.08126/) (2024)
- [Demystifying Advertising Campaign Bid Recommendation: A Constraint target CPA Goal Optimization](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2212.13915/) (2022)

## Abstract (arXiv)

The generalized second price (GSP) auction has served as the core selling mechanism for sponsored search ads for over a decade. However, recent trends expanding the set of allowed ad formats---to include a variety of sizes, decorations, and other distinguishing features---have raised critical problems for GSP-based platforms. Alternatives such as the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction raise different complications because they fundamentally change the way prices are computed. In this paper we report on our efforts to redesign a search ad selling system from the ground up in this new context, proposing a mechanism that optimizes an entire slate of ads globally and computes prices that achieve properties analogous to those held by GSP in the original, simpler setting of uniform ads. A careful algorithmic coupling of allocation-optimization and pricing-computation allows our auction to operate within the strict timing constraints inherent in real-time ad auctions. We report performance results of the auction in Yahoo's Gemini Search platform.