# Multiwinner Approval Rules as Apportionment Methods

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/1611.08691 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/1611.08691/

## Key facts

- Cited by 5 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 26 Nov 2016.

## Built on by (most cited first, 5 of 5)

- [Fair Submodular Cover](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.04804/) (2024)
- [DiRe Committee : Diversity and Representation Constraints in Multiwinner Elections](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2107.07356/) (2021)
- [Fairness in Streaming Submodular Maximization over a Matroid Constraint](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.15118/) (2023)
- [Fairness in Submodular Maximization over a Matroid Constraint](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2312.14299/) (2023)
- [Strengthening Full Justified Representation: Efficient Verification and Computation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.11500/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We establish a link between multiwinner elections and apportionment problems by showing how approval-based multiwinner election rules can be interpreted as methods of apportionment. We consider several multiwinner rules and observe that they induce apportionment methods that are well-established in the literature on proportional representation. For instance, we show that Proportional Approval Voting induces the D'Hondt method and that Monroe's rule induces the largest reminder method. We also consider properties of apportionment methods and exhibit multiwinner rules that induce apportionment methods satisfying these properties.