# C-FLAT: Control-FLow ATtestation for Embedded Systems Software

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/1605.07763 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/1605.07763/

## Key facts

- Cited by 8 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 25 May 2016.

## Built on by (most cited first, 8 of 8)

- [Proof of Unlearning: Definitions and Instantiation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2210.11334/) (2022)
- [One for All and All for One: GNN-based Control-Flow Attestation for Embedded Devices](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.07465/) (2024)
- [VerifiableFL: Verifiable Claims for Federated Learning using Exclaves](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2412.10537/) (2024)
- [Enabling Trustworthy Federated Learning via Remote Attestation for Mitigating Byzantine Threats](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2509.00634/) (2025)
- [AttestLLM: Efficient Attestation Framework for Billion-scale On-device LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2509.06326/) (2025)
- [Code Integrity Attestation for PLCs using Black Box Neural Network Predictions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2106.07851/) (2021)
- [Walma: Learning to See Memory Corruption in WebAssembly](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2603.24167/) (2026)
- [Downsides of Smartness Across Edge-Cloud Continuum in Modern Industry](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2603.29289/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Remote attestation is a crucial security service particularly relevant to increasingly popular IoT (and other embedded) devices. It allows a trusted party (verifier) to learn the state of a remote, and potentially malware-infected, device (prover). Most existing approaches are static in nature and only check whether benign software is initially loaded on the prover. However, they are vulnerable to run-time attacks that hijack the application's control or data flow, e.g., via return-oriented programming or data-oriented exploits. As a concrete step towards more comprehensive run-time remote attestation, we present the design and implementation of Control- FLow ATtestation (C-FLAT) that enables remote attestation of an application's control-flow path, without requiring the source code. We describe a full prototype implementation of C-FLAT on Raspberry Pi using its ARM TrustZone hardware security extensions. We evaluate C-FLAT's performance using a real-world embedded (cyber-physical) application, and demonstrate its efficacy against control-flow hijacking attacks.