# Mean-field-game model for Botnet defense in Cyber-security

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/1511.06642 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/1511.06642/

## Key facts

- Cited by 8 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 20 Nov 2015.

## Built on by (most cited first, 8 of 8)

- [Oracle-free Reinforcement Learning in Mean-Field Games along a Single Sample Path](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2208.11639/) (2022)
- [Learning Sparse Graphon Mean Field Games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2209.03880/) (2022)
- [Deep Backward and Galerkin Methods for the Finite State Master Equation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.04975/) (2024)
- [Model-free policy gradient for discrete-time mean-field control](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2601.11217/) (2026)
- [Reinforcement Learning for Finite Space Mean-Field Type Games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2409.18152/) (2024)
- [Operator Learning for Families of Finite-State Mean-Field Games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.13169/) (2026)
- [Neural Parameter Calibration for Finite-State Mean Field Games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.23155/) (2026)
- [Mean field games as a tool for AI safety: a worked example from the July 2026 Hugging Face incident](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2610.00902/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We initiate the analysis of the response of computer owners to various offers of defence systems against a cyber-hacker (for instance, a botnet attack), as a stochastic game of a large number of interacting agents. We introduce a simple mean-field game that models their behavior. It takes into account both the random process of the propagation of the infection (controlled by the botner herder) and the decision making process of customers. Its stationary version turns out to be exactly solvable (but not at all trivial) under an additional natural assumption that the execution time of the decisions of the customers (say, switch on or out the defence system) is much faster that the infection rates.
