# Stable Matching Mechanisms are Not Obviously Strategy-Proof

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/1511.00452 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/1511.00452/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 2 Nov 2015.

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Regret, stability & fairness in matching markets with bandit learners](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2102.06246/) (2021)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Many two-sided matching markets, from labor markets to school choice programs, use a clearinghouse based on the applicant-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm, which is well known to be strategy-proof for the applicants. Nonetheless, a growing amount of empirical evidence reveals that applicants misrepresent their preferences when this mechanism is used. This paper shows that no mechanism that implements a stable matching is "obviously strategy-proof" for any side of the market, a stronger incentive property than strategy-proofness that was introduced by Li (2017). A stable mechanism that is obviously strategy-proof for applicants is introduced for the case in which agents on the other side have acyclical preferences.