# Parliamentary Voting Procedures: Agenda Control, Manipulation, and Uncertainty

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/1509.02424 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/1509.02424/

## Key facts

- Cited by 3 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 8 Sep 2015.

## Built on by (most cited first, 3 of 3)

- [Drawing a Map of Elections](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2504.03809/) (2025)
- [Learning Small Decision Trees with Few Outliers: A Parameterized Perspective](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.15648/) (2025)
- [Exact Algorithms and Lower Bounds for Forming Coalitions of Constrained Maximum Size](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.22384/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We study computational problems for two popular parliamentary voting procedures: the amendment procedure and the successive procedure. While finding successful manipulations or agenda controls is tractable for both procedures, our real-world experimental results indicate that most elections cannot be manipulated by a few voters and agenda control is typically impossible. If the voter preferences are incomplete, then finding which alternatives can possibly win is NP-hard for both procedures. Whilst deciding if an alternative necessarily wins is coNP-hard for the amendment procedure, it is polynomial-time solvable for the successive one.