# Welfare Maximization Entices Participation

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/1508.03538 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/1508.03538/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 14 Aug 2015.

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Differentially Private Condorcet Voting](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2206.13081/) (2022)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We consider randomized mechanisms with optional participation. Preferences over lotteries are modeled using skew-symmetric bilinear (SSB) utility functions, a generalization of classic von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. We show that every welfare-maximizing mechanism entices participation and that the converse holds under additional assumptions. Two important corollaries of our results are characterizations of an attractive randomized voting rule that satisfies Condorcet-consistency and entices participation. This stands in contrast to a well-known result by Moulin (1988), who proves that no deterministic voting rule can satisfy both properties simultaneously.