# Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/1507.07677 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/1507.07677/

## Key facts

- Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 28 Jul 2015.

## Built on by (most cited first, 4 of 4)

- [Optimal Private Payoff Manipulation against Commitment in Extensive-form Games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2206.13119/) (2022)
- [Function Approximation for Solving Stackelberg Equilibrium in Large Perfect Information Games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2212.14431/) (2022)
- [Stochastic Principal-Agent Problems: Efficient Computation and Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.03832/) (2023)
- [Efficiently Solving Turn-Taking Stochastic Games with Extensive-Form Correlation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2412.16934/) (2024)

## Abstract (arXiv)

The Stackelberg equilibrium solution concept describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (termed the leader) publicly commits to a strategy and Player 2 (termed the follower) plays a best response to this strategy (ties are broken in favor of the leader). We study Stackelberg equilibria in finite sequential games (or extensive-form games) and provide new exact algorithms, approximate algorithms, and hardness results for several classes of these sequential games.