# Bitcoin Blockchain Dynamics: the Selfish-Mine Strategy in the Presence of Propagation Delay

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/1505.05343 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/1505.05343/

## Key facts

- Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 20 May 2015.

## Built on by (most cited first, 2 of 2)

- [Performance Evaluation, Optimization and Dynamic Decision in Blockchain Systems: A Recent Overview](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2211.15907/) (2022)
- [Spec2Twin-Chain: Orchestrating Bi-Level Optimization with LLMs for Blockchain Digital Twin Construction](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.30050/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

In the context of the `selfish-mine' strategy proposed by Eyal and Sirer, we study the effect of propagation delay on the evolution of the Bitcoin blockchain. First, we use a simplified Markov model that tracks the contrasting states of belief about the blockchain of a small pool of miners and the `rest of the community' to establish that the use of block-hiding strategies, such as selfish-mine, causes the rate of production of orphan blocks to increase. Then we use a spatial Poisson process model to study values of Eyal and Sirer's parameter γ, which denotes the proportion of the honest community that mine on a previously-secret block released by the pool in response to the mining of a block by the honest community. Finally, we use discrete-event simulation to study the behaviour of a network of Bitcoin miners, a proportion of which is colluding in using the selfish-mine strategy, under the assumption that there is a propagation delay in the communication of information between miners.