# Program Actions as Actual Causes: A Building Block for Accountability

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/1505.01131 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/1505.01131/

## Key facts

- Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 5 May 2015.

## Built on by (most cited first, 4 of 4)

- [On Blame Attribution for Accountable Multi-Agent Sequential Decision Making](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2107.11927/) (2021)
- [Actual Causality and Responsibility Attribution in Decentralized Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2204.00302/) (2022)
- [Causal Kripke Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.05631/) (2023)
- [AUDITA: certified auditing and causal attribution of adverse outcomes in autonomous multi-agent systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.22160/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Protocols for tasks such as authentication, electronic voting, and secure multiparty computation ensure desirable security properties if agents follow their prescribed programs. However, if some agents deviate from their prescribed programs and a security property is violated, it is important to hold agents accountable by determining which deviations actually caused the violation. Motivated by these applications, we initiate a formal study of program actions as actual causes. Specifically, we define in an interacting program model what it means for a set of program actions to be an actual cause of a violation. We present a sound technique for establishing program actions as actual causes. We demonstrate the value of this formalism in two ways. First, we prove that violations of a specific class of safety properties always have an actual cause. Thus, our definition applies to relevant security properties. Second, we provide a cause analysis of a representative protocol designed to address weaknesses in the current public key certification infrastructure.