# Elections with Few Voters: Candidate Control Can Be Easy

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/1411.7812 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/1411.7812/

## Key facts

- Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 28 Nov 2014.

## Built on by (most cited first, 2 of 2)

- [Bribery as a Measure of Candidate Success: Complexity Results for Approval-Based Multiwinner Rules](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2104.09130/) (2021)
- [On the Complexity of Winner Determination and Strategic Control in Conditional Approval Voting](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2202.01660/) (2022)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We study the computational complexity of candidate control in elections with few voters, that is, we consider the parameterized complexity of candidate control in elections with respect to the number of voters as a parameter. We consider both the standard scenario of adding and deleting candidates, where one asks whether a given candidate can become a winner (or, in the destructive case, can be precluded from winning) by adding or deleting few candidates, as well as a combinatorial scenario where adding/deleting a candidate automatically means adding or deleting a whole group of candidates. Considering several fundamental voting rules, our results show that the parameterized complexity of candidate control, with the number of voters as the parameter, is much more varied than in the setting with many voters.