# Congestion Games with Distance-Based Strict Uncertainty

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/1411.4943 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/1411.4943/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 18 Nov 2014.

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [A Game-Theoretic Framework for Managing Risk in Multi-Agent Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2205.15434/) (2022)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We put forward a new model of congestion games where agents have uncertainty over the routes used by other agents. We take a non-probabilistic approach, assuming that each agent knows that the number of agents using an edge is within a certain range. Given this uncertainty, we model agents who either minimize their worst-case cost (WCC) or their worst-case regret (WCR), and study implications on equilibrium existence, convergence through adaptive play, and efficiency. Under the WCC behavior the game reduces to a modified congestion game, and welfare improves when agents have moderate uncertainty. Under WCR behavior the game is not, in general, a congestion game, but we show convergence and efficiency bounds for a simple class of games.