# Translucent Players: Explaining Cooperative Behavior in Social Dilemmas

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/1410.3363 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/1410.3363/

## Key facts

- Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 13 Oct 2014.

## Built on by (most cited first, 4 of 4)

- [Game Theory with Simulation in the Presence of Unpredictable Randomisation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.14311/) (2024)
- [Accumulating Risk Capital Through Investing in Cooperation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2101.10305/) (2021)
- [Game-Theoretic Models of Moral and Other-Regarding Agents (extended abstract)](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2106.11503/) (2021)
- [Towards Sustainable Investment Policies Informed by Opponent Shaping](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.11829/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

In the last few decades, numerous experiments have shown that humans do not always behave so as to maximize their material payoff. Cooperative behavior when non-cooperation is a dominant strategy (with respect to the material payoffs) is particularly puzzling. Here we propose a novel approach to explain cooperation, assuming what Halpern and Pass (2013) call "translucent players". Typically, players are assumed to be "opaque", in the sense that a deviation by one player does not affect the strategies used by other players. But a player may believe that if he switches from one strategy to another, the fact that he chooses to switch may be visible to the other players. For example, if he chooses to defect in Prisoner's Dilemma, the other player may sense his guilt. We show that by assuming translucent players, we can recover many of the regularities observed in human behavior in well-studied games such as Prisoner's Dilemma, Traveler's Dilemma, Bertrand Competition, and the Public Goods game.