# Combinatorial Voter Control in Elections

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/1406.6859 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/1406.6859/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 26 Jun 2014.

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [On the Complexity of Winner Determination and Strategic Control in Conditional Approval Voting](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2202.01660/) (2022)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Voter control problems model situations such as an external agent trying to affect the result of an election by adding voters, for example by convincing some voters to vote who would otherwise not attend the election. Traditionally, voters are added one at a time, with the goal of making a distinguished alternative win by adding a minimum number of voters. In this paper, we initiate the study of combinatorial variants of control by adding voters: In our setting, when we choose to add a voter~v, we also have to add a whole bundle kappa(v) of voters associated with v. We study the computational complexity of this problem for two of the most basic voting rules, namely the Plurality rule and the Condorcet rule.