# Knightian Analysis of the Vickrey Mechanism

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/1403.6413 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/1403.6413/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 25 Mar 2014.

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [SoK: Decentralized Agent Economic Infrastructure](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2610.01756/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We analyze the Vickrey mechanism for auctions of multiple identical goods when the players have both Knightian uncertainty over their own valuations and incomplete preferences. In this model, the Vickrey mechanism is no longer dominant-strategy, and we prove that all dominant-strategy mechanisms are inadequate. However, we also prove that, in undominated strategies, the social welfare produced by the Vickrey mechanism in the worst case is not only very good, but also essentially optimal.