# Strategic Argumentation is NP-Complete

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/1312.4287 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/1312.4287/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 16 Dec 2013.

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Judicial Permission](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.04610/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

In this paper we study the complexity of strategic argumentation for dialogue games. A dialogue game is a 2-player game where the parties play arguments. We show how to model dialogue games in a skeptical, non-monotonic formalism, and we show that the problem of deciding what move (set of rules) to play at each turn is an NP-complete problem.
