# Stationary Markov Perfect Equilibria in Discounted Stochastic Games

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/1311.1562 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/1311.1562/

## Key facts

- Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 7 Nov 2013.

## Built on by (most cited first, 2 of 2)

- [The Confluence of Networks, Games and Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2105.08158/) (2021)
- [Informational Design of Dynamic Multi-Agent System](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2105.03052/) (2021)

## Abstract (arXiv)

The existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in stochastic games is shown under a general condition called "(decomposable) coarser transition kernels". This result covers various earlier existence results on correlated equilibria, noisy stochastic games, stochastic games with finite actions and state-independent transitions, and stochastic games with mixtures of constant transition kernels as special cases. A remarkably simple proof is provided via establishing a new connection between stochastic games and conditional expectations of correspondences. New applications of stochastic games are presented as illustrative examples, including stochastic games with endogenous shocks and a stochastic dynamic oligopoly model.