# Optimal Impartial Selection

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/1310.8631 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/1310.8631/

## Key facts

- Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 31 Oct 2013.

## Built on by (most cited first, 4 of 4)

- [Strategyproofing Peer Assessment via Partitioning: The Price in Terms of Evaluators' Expertise](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2201.10631/) (2022)
- [Peer Selection with Noisy Assessments](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2107.10121/) (2021)
- [Manipulation and Peer Mechanisms: A Survey](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2210.01984/) (2022)
- [Impartial Selection with Predictions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.19002/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We study the problem of selecting a member of a set of agents based on impartial nominations by agents from that set. The problem was studied previously by Alon et al. and Holzman and Moulin and has important applications in situations where representatives are selected from within a group or where publishing or funding decisions are made based on a process of peer review. Our main result concerns a randomized mechanism that in expectation awards the prize to an agent with at least half the maximum number of nominations. Subject to impartiality, this is best possible.