# Complexity of Manipulation, Bribery, and Campaign Management in Bucklin and Fallback Voting

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/1307.7322 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/1307.7322/

## Key facts

- Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 28 Jul 2013.

## Built on by (most cited first, 2 of 2)

- [Let's Agree to Agree: Targeting Consensus for Incomplete Preferences through Majority Dynamics](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2205.00881/) (2022)
- [Voter Priming Campaigns: Strategies, Equilibria, and Algorithms](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2412.13380/) (2024)

## Abstract (arXiv)

A central theme in computational social choice is to study the extent to which voting systems computationally resist manipulative attacks seeking to influence the outcome of elections, such as manipulation (i.e., strategic voting), control, and bribery. Bucklin and fallback voting are among the voting systems with the broadest resistance (i.e., NP-hardness) to control attacks. However, only little is known about their behavior regarding manipulation and bribery attacks. We comprehensively investigate the computational resistance of Bucklin and fallback voting for many of the common manipulation and bribery scenarios; we also complement our discussion by considering several campaign management problems for Bucklin and fallback.