# Implementation without commitment in moral hazard environments

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/1303.0916 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/1303.0916/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 5 Mar 2013.

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [AI Testing Should Account for Sophisticated Strategic Behaviour](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2508.14927/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Interdependent-choice equilibrium is defined as an extension of correlated equilibrium in which the mediator is able to choose the timing of her signals, and observe the actions taken by the players. The set of interdependent-choice equilibria is a nonempty, closed and convex polytope. It characterizes all the outcomes that can be implemented in single shot interactions without repetition, side payments, binding contracts or any other form of delegation.