# Prior-independent Auctions for Risk-averse Agents

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/1301.0401 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/1301.0401/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 3 Jan 2013.

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Bandits for Sponsored Search Auctions under Unknown Valuation Model: Case Study in E-Commerce Advertising](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2304.00999/) (2023)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We study simple and approximately optimal auctions for agents with a particular form of risk-averse preferences. We show that, for symmetric agents, the optimal revenue (given a prior distribution over the agent preferences) can be approximated by the first-price auction (which is prior independent), and, for asymmetric agents, the optimal revenue can be approximated by an auction with simple form. These results are based on two technical methods. The first is for upper-bounding the revenue from a risk-averse agent. The second gives a payment identity for mechanisms with pay-your-bid semantics.